1Gécamines “missing revenues”
The Carter Center’s November 2017 report, A State Affair, found that of roughly USD 1.1bn Gécamines should have received from partnerships in 2011–2014, about USD 750m could not be reliably traced in its accounts. Global Witness separately found Glencore redirected over USD 75m of payments owed to Gécamines to Dan Gertler (2013–2016).
These figures predate the current window but remain the reference point for every later argument. Well corroborated· Carter CenterGlobal WitnessBloomberg
2Sicomines: the minerals-for-infrastructure deal
The 2008 Sino-Congolese agreement was renegotiated in March 2024 (Amendment 5), lifting committed infrastructure to up to USD 7bn (from ~USD 3bn), at about USD 324m per year of mainly road financing to 2040, conditional on copper staying above USD 8,000/tonne. Shareholding stayed at 68% Chinese / 32% Gécamines. Well corroborated· Mining WeeklyChina-Global SouthResource Matters
CNPAV welcomed publication of the amendment but argues it leaves the structural imbalance intact, estimating a USD 132m loss in 2024 alone from tax exemptions, ~USD 443m lost by 2023, and a potential USD 7.5bn over 17 years. Contested· CNPAV’s own un-audited estimate
3Beneficial ownership and the Gertler affair
Dan Gertler was sanctioned by the US Treasury under Global Magnitsky in December 2017, with affiliated entities added in 2018. Through 2024–2025 there were repeated reports of negotiations over conditional sanctions relief in exchange for a full DRC exit and the return of royalty streams, alongside a 2025 deal in which Gertler’s Ventora returned assets to the state. Well corroborated· US TreasuryBloombergopenDemocracy
Whether relief was ultimately granted is not confirmed; sources establish negotiation, not completion. Single source· outcome unverified
4EGC and the artisanal cobalt monopoly
EGC, a Gécamines subsidiary established 2019 and operational from 2021, holds monopoly rights to buy and (from 2024–25) export artisanal cobalt, an estimated 15–30% of national output. The debate: does a state monopsony improve traceability and artisanal-miner welfare, or simply concentrate rents? Corroborated· BHRRCacademic
5The cobalt export ban and quota regime
Against a price collapse (European cobalt fell ~74% from its May 2022 peak to ~USD 10/lb by February 2025), the DRC imposed an export suspension in February 2025, extended it, then replaced it with a quota system: an 87,000-tonne annual cap for 2026 (about 7,250 t/month, plus a discretionary strategic quota of ~9,600 t). Exports resumed in December 2025 after roughly ten months, though early clearances ran well below quota because of logistical bottlenecks. Prices recovered sharply over 2025. Well corroborated· BenchmarkFastmarketsS&PAfricanews
6The US–DRC minerals-and-security pivot (2025–2026)
Amid M23’s advances in the east, a US-mediated framework led to the US–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement, signed 4 December 2025, alongside a trilateral DRC–US–Rwanda set of agreements. It creates a Strategic Asset Reserve, gives US persons a right of first offer on designated assets and on minerals destined for export, and sets Lobito/Sakania corridor export targets (5-year goals of 50% of copper, 90% of zinc concentrate, 30% of cobalt). The US-backed Orion consortium signed an MoU to take 40% of Glencore’s Mutanda and KCC interests (~USD 9bn, not closed). Congolese lawyers have filed a constitutional challenge arguing the agreement breaches sovereignty-over-resources provisions. Well corroborated· US State DeptPublic CitizenOakland Inst.Mongabay